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Introduction
On January 7, 1981, a Civil Aviation Authority of China (CAAC) Boe-
ing 747 touched down at San Francisco International Airport, marking the
resumption of air service between the People's Republic of China and the
United States for the first time since the Communist Revolution of 1949.1
While the flight's 139 passengers shuffled off the aircraft and made their
way through customs and immigration, San Francisco Mayor Dianne Fein-
t J.D., Cornell Law School, 2002; B.A., Hamilton College, 1996.
1. See Wallace Turner, Scheduled Air Service from China to U.S. Resumes, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1981, at A16.
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stein and Chinese Consul General Hu Ding-yi stood nearby, taking part in
a celebratory ribbon-cutting ceremony. 2 Mayor Feinstein called the event
"an exciting and historic occasion," while Consul General Hu predicted
that the opening of the air route would lead to increased travel between
China and the United States. 3 Later that month, Pan American World Air-
ways (Pan Am), which had itself offered U.S.-China service until 1949,
resumed service with flights to Shanghai and Beijing.4
The resumption of flights from the United States to China was made
possible in part by a September 1980 bilateral aviation agreement that
granted each country the right to designate two airlines to provide interna-
tional service between the nations.5 Without such an agreement in place,
the two nations could not have restored international air links. Even today,
international flights only operate where authorized by a treaty between the
nations served. 6
The agreement governing U.S.-China airline service was similar to the
bilateral agreements that had governed the airline industry since the end of
the Second World War. Like its predecessors, the agreement imposed
sharp limitations upon the number of flights each country's airlines could
operate7 and limited them to two airports, known as gateway cities, in
China, and five in the United States. 8 The agreement also gave each nation
the power to review and reject fares charged by the other's airlines. 9
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of The People's Republic of China Relating to Civil Air Transport, Sept. 17,
1980, U.S.-P.R.C., T.I.A.S. No.10,326, at 4 [hereinafter U.S.-China 1980 Agreement]. In
1980, the Civil Aviation Authority of China (CAAC), the Chinese state-run airline, oper-
ated all civilian passenger flights in China. Craig S. Smith, China to Merge Domestic
Carriers in Reorganization, N.Y. TiMEs, July 22, 2000, at C2. In the late 1980s, however,
CAAC was split into six regional carriers. Id. In addition, the Chinese government later
allowed provincial governments to create their own airlines. Id.
6. Gerald L. Baliles, Fear of Flying: Aviation Protectionism and Global Growth, For-
eign Affairs,May/June 1997, at 8.
7. U.S.-China 1980 Agreement, supra note 5, at 40. Initially, both countries could
designate two airlines, each of which could operate two weekly roundtrip flights
between the United States and China. However, the treaty allocated additional round-
trip frequencies in the event that an airline chose to operate its flights utilizing aircraft
with certified maximum takeoff weights of less than 710,000 pounds. Id. An aircraft
with a maximum takeoff weight between 430,000 and 710,000 pounds could operate
one and a half roundtrips, while, an aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of less than
430,000 pounds could fly two roundtrips. Id.
8. Id. at 35-36. Under the 1980 agreement, international flights operating
between the United States and China were restricted to the following airports in the
United States: New York City (John F. Kennedy International Airport), Los Angeles (Los
Angeles International Airport), San Francisco (San Francisco International Airport),
Honolulu (Honolulu International Airport), and Anchorage (Anchorage International
Airport). Id. In China, flights were restricted to the following airports: Beijing (Capital
Airport) and Shanghai (Hongqiao Airport). Id. In addition, the agreement specified
fourteen alternate airports in the United States and three alternate airports in China to
be used in the event of a diversion from the assigned airport. Id.
9. Id. at 17.
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In the years that followed, the agreement evolved through a series of
amendments to allow an increase in the number of flights and airlines that
could operate them. In 1999, the United States and China modified their
agreement to allow each nation to authorize four carriers to fly between the
two nations beginning in 2001.10 As under the original version of the
treaty, each carrier can operate passenger service, cargo service or a com-
bination of both."' The amended agreement also allows the designated
airlines to serve a number of additional gateway cities 12 and allows them to
serve the gateway cities from any city within their home countries. 13
Despite liberalization, the agreement continues to cap the total number of
weekly flights each country may operate at fifty-four. 14 Furthermore, the
agreement continues to restrict service by U.S. passenger carriers to a
handful of gateway cities in China, while similarly limiting the U.S. gate-
way cities that Chinese passenger carriers may serve.15 Currently, U.S.
carriers United Airlines, Northwest Airlines, FedEx, and United Parcel Ser-
vice, and Chinese carriers Air China, China Eastern, and China Southern,
share exclusive rights to serve the U.S.-China market. 16
10. See generally Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of the United
States and the Peoples Republic of China Relating to Civil Air Transport, as amended,
Apr. 8, 1999, U.S.-P.R.C., Hein's No. KAV 5630 [hereinafter 1999 Amendments]
(allowing the United States and China to designate up to four airlines to provide U.S.-
China service, with each nation's airlines offering up to fifty-four weekly roundtrip fre-
quencies). Hong Kong, which became a part of China in 1997, continued to be covered
under a separately negotiated and less restrictive aviation treaty, which was recently
further liberalized.
11. Id. at 3-5; U.S.-China 1980 Agreement, supra note 5, at 6. Under the 1992
Amendments, which authorized each country to designate three airlines to provide inter-
national service, one designated airline from each nation was limited exclusively to
cargo operations. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of The People's Republic of China Amending the Agreement of
September 17, 1980, Feb. 10, 1992, U.S.-P.R.C., T.I.A.S. No.12, 448, at 6-7 [hereinafter
1992 Amendments].
12. 1999 Amendments, supra note 10, at 3-5. The 1999 amendments designate
Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing as the Chinese cities that U.S. passenger flights may
serve. Id. The U.S. government may select two additional Chinese gateway cities that
U.S. passenger carriers may serve. Id. The 1999 amendments also permit Chinese pas-
senger flights to serve additional U.S. gateway cities including Chicago, Fairbanks, Seat-
tle, Atlanta, and Portland. Id. The Chinese government may also select two additional
U.S. gateway cities to be used for Chinese airline passenger operations. Id. Cargo carri-
ers from both countries may fly to any airport in either country open for scheduled
operations. Id.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3-5.
16. However, it is possible to travel between the United States and China on third-
nation carriers. For example, British Airways offers service between the United States
and China, requiring a change of planes in London. Although such service is generally
non-competitive with direct or non-stop service offered by U.S. and Chinese carriers,
third-nation airlines carry approximately one third of all U.S.-China traffic. Alan Lar-
son, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, U.S.
China Aviation Relations: Building for the Future, Remarks at the U.S. China Aviation
Symposium, Washington, D.C., Oct. 17, 2000, available at http://usembassy-austra-
lia.state.gov/hyper/2000/1017/epf2O6.htm.
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While the airlines of most nations continue to conduct substantial
portions of their international flight operations under the auspices of bilat-
eral agreements similar to the U.S.-China agreement, a new liberalization
trend has rapidly taken hold in recent years. 17 The foundation of this U.S.-
led trend has been new, nearly restriction-free bilateral treaties, better
known as "open skies" agreements.' 8 Under an open skies agreement, the
airlines of the nations party to the agreement may operate flights between
the two nations, restricted only by safety concerns and airport capacity
issues.19 Unlike standard bilateral agreements, open skies agreements
eliminate traditional governmental roles in determining routes, designating
the airlines that may fly them, and controlling frequency of service and
pricing.20 Instead, under an open skies agreement, market forces deter-
mine these matters. 2 '
Proponents of open skies agreements contend that such arrangements
stimulate airline competition, which in turn lead to lower fares and better
service for the traveling public. 22 They argue that open skies permit avia-
tion markets to grow in accordance with demand, thereby allowing airlines
to offer more convenient and affordable air service to both passengers and
shippers. 23 This growth, they argue, leads to economic expansion for the
nations party to the agreement. 24 Although the oldest open skies agree-
ments date back only a decade, evidence suggests that the proponents of
such agreements are correct. 25 In numerous instances, growth in open
skies aviation markets has significantly outpaced growth in similar mar-
kets governed by traditional, more restrictive bilateral treaties. Further-
more, in open skies markets, service levels have increased while fares have
fallen. 26
Counted among the ranks of open skies proponents are U.S. airlines,
which seek to expand their operations, especially in rapidly growing econ-
omies like China's. In fact, China, with a population of well over one bil-
lion people and a GDP of one trillion dollars, represents a potential gold
17. See Derek Lick, Note, More Turbulence Ahead: A Bumpy Ride During U.S.-Japanese
Aviation Talks Exemplifies the Need for a Pragmatic Course in Future Aviation Negotiations,
31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1207, 1215-20 (1998).
18. Id. at 1213-15.
19. Id. at 1213.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater has made such an
argument. Aviation Pact Lifts Flight, Price Restrictions for Pacific Rim, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS,
Nov. 27, 2000.
23. Id.
24. See China Liberalization Seen As Key To WTO, PNTR Benefits, AVIATION DAILY,
Oct. 19, 2000, at 7.
25. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., INTERNATIONAL AVIATION DEVELOPMENTS, SECOND REPORT:
TRANSNAT'L DEREGULATION, THE ALLIANCE NETWORK EFFECT, at 1 (2000), available at http:/
/ostpxweb.dst.gov/aviation/intav/globalrpt.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DOT Report].
26. Id.
Vol. 35
2002 U.S.-China Aviation Relations
mine for the U.S. airline industry. 2 7 Although China's passenger aviation
market stands at approximately one fifth the size of the U.S. market, its
potential for growth appears enormous. 28 Additionally, China is the
United States' second largest trading partner, and air cargo traffic between
the two nations grew at twice the rate of passenger traffic during the late
1990s. 2 9
There remain, however, opponents of open skies agreements, most
notably governments of nations that subsidize national flag carriers and
therefore fear the consequences of unrestrained competition against more
efficient foreign carriers. 30 Other opponents include the airlines them-
selves, which may benefit from their positions as incumbent carriers in
markets closed to new entrants.3 1 Additionally, some airline industry
observers have warned of the risk of "destructive competition" among air-
lines that may accompany a move toward a deregulated open skies
environment.
32
Parts I and II of this Note examine the developments leading to the
implementation of open skies agreements, and their effects upon the air-
line industry and the member countries' economies. In Part II, this Note
discusses the impact of early open skies agreements. Parts IV and V review
recent developments in the U.S.-China aviation market and explore the
sources of resistance to the implementation of an open skies agreement in
27. See THE WORLD BANK GROUP, CHINA AT A GLANCE, at http://www.worldbank.org/
data/countrydata/ aag/chnaag.pdf. GDP totaled nearly $1.1 trillion in 2000, with
annual growth of 7.9 percent. Id.
28. See China Forecasts Need for 900 Aircraft for Its Carriers, AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 8,
2000, at 5; BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, THE OFFICE OF AIRLINE INFO., HISTORICAL AIR
TRAFFIC STATISTICS: ANNUAL 1981-2000, at http://www.bts.gov/oai/indicators/airtraffic/
annual/ 1981-2000.html.
29. See Brookings Economist Says U.S. Should Use New China Air Services to Expand
Air Cargo Capacity; Robert C. Litan Says Economic Value to the U.S. of New Cargo Capacity
Exceeds Benefits of Adding New Passenger Routes, PR NEWSWRE ASS'N INC., Apr. 4, 2000,
LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter Brookings Economist]. According to Brookings Institu-
tion economist Robert E. Litan, forty percent of world trade, measured by value, travels
via air cargo. Id. U.S. exports of high value goods, such as computers and telecommuni-
cations equipment, to China shipped via all modes of transport have grown rapidly in
recent years. Id.
30. One U.S. airline observer recently commented, "Like most governments, the
[Chinese] transport ministries are a bit too preoccupied with the health of their airlines
and therefore spend little time understanding the effects transport systems have on the
economy as a whole." China Says Slow, U.S. Pushes for Go, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Oct.
20, 2000, LEXIS, News Library [hereinafter U.S. Pushes for Go].
31. For example, British Airways has benefited tremendously in recent years from its
status as the dominant carrier at London's Heathrow Airport. The U.S.-Britain aviation
treaty, a restrictive bilateral agreement known as Bermuda II, severely limits American
airlines' access to Heathrow. See, e.g., Lick, supra note 17, at 1264.
32. Andras Vamos-Goldman, The Stagnation of Economic Regulation Under Public
International Law Air Law: Examining Its Contribution to the Woeful State of the Airline
Industry, 23 TRANSP. L. J. 425, 444-45 (1996). Destructive competition, Vamos-
Goldman notes, may result from overcapacity, which can accompany a move towards
deregulation, as numerous new airlines simultaneously enter the market. Id. The inher-
ent unpredictability of open skies and deregulation makes it difficult for airlines to
engage in long-range planning, which is necessary for many aspects of operations-nota-
bly fleet acquisition. Id.
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that market. In Part VI, this Note considers the potential impact of a U.S.-
China open skies agreement and proposes strategies for the U.S. govern-
ment to employ in negotiating such an accord with China.3 3 This Note
concludes that in addition to any inducements the U.S. government offers
China to move toward open skies, the United States must continue to stead-
fastly promote the benefits of open skies, which extend far beyond the air-
line industry.
I. Pre-Open Skies: An Overview
Traditional bilateral aviation agreements are best characterized by the
restrictions they impose upon the airlines flying between the signatory
nations.34 These restrictions typically limit the number of airlines author-
ized to fly between the two nations, the number of flights operated, the
total passenger and cargo traffic carried, and the fares charged. 35
A. The Chicago Convention
Two international conventions provided the impetus for the creation of
traditional, restrictive bilateral agreements that governed international air-
line operations for nearly half a century. The Paris Convention of 1919,
signed by thirty-two nations, set forth aircraft operation standards and
specifications, and required party nations to release aviation information
necessary for international flights to occur. 36 During ensuing decades,
however, world leaders realized that the rapidly expanding commercial avi-
ation industry required a more comprehensive agreement. 3 7 This led to
the Conference on International Civil Aviation in Chicago, attended by
more than fifty nations in late 1944.38
The resulting Convention on International Air Services Transit Agree-
ment (Chicago Convention) established two key "freedoms" of the sky
among the signatory nations: (1) the right of a nation's airlines to fly over
the territory of another nation in order to reach a third; and (2) the right of
a nation's airlines to make technical stops for fuel and maintenance, but
not to load or unload passengers or cargo, in another nation while in
33. These include efforts to establish additional cooperative agreements between
U.S. carriers and their Chinese counterparts as a condition to an open skies agreement.
Cooperative agreements, ranging from coordination of services to strategic alliances and
partnerships, could help Chinese airlines begin to close the gap with their U.S. competi-
tors and allay Chinese government officials' fears of the elimination of their airlines by a
highly efficient and competitive U.S. airline industry operating under the guise of an
open skies agreement. However, as indicated by the tremendous financial losses that the
U.S. airline industry suffered in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, the
invincibility of the U.S. airline may not equate with the Chinese government's fears. See
infra, subpart V(C).
34. Lick, supra note 17, at 1211.
35. Id.
36. Garick L. H. Goo, Note, Deregulation and Liberalization of Air Transport in the
Pacific Rim: Are They Ready for America's "Open Skies"?, 18 U. HAw. L. REV. 541, 544
(1996).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 544-45.
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transit to a third nation.39
Notwithstanding these advances, the Chicago Convention proved
more notable for what it did not establish. Despite strong U.S. support, the
signatory nations failed to ratify a proposed annex40 setting forth three
more freedoms: (1) the right of one nation's airlines to freely transport
cargo and passengers from its home nation to a second nation; (2) the
right of one nation's airlines to freely transport cargo and passengers from
a second nation back to its home nation; and (3) the right of one nation's
airlines to freely transport cargo and passengers between a second and
third nation, also known as a "fifth freedom" or a "beyond right."41
Instead, the Chicago Convention left these rights to individual nations to
negotiate with each other on a case-by-case basis.42 Had these three free-
doms won approval, the Chicago Convention would, in effect, have estab-
lished a broad, multilateral open skies agreement among many of the
world's industrialized nations.
B. Bermuda I and Its Progeny
In 1946, following the Chicago Convention, the United States negoti-
ated a treaty with Great Britain,43 creating the first of more than 1,200
bilateral aviation agreements currently in existence. 44 Known as Bermuda
I,4 5 the agreement represented a compromise between two sharply oppos-
ing views on the regulation of international air transport. 46 The United
States supported a largely unregulated aviation market; whereas, Britain
sought greater governmental control.47
More importantly, Bermuda I helped to institute acceptance of govern-
ment involvement in the regulation of international air service. 48 In the
aftermath of World War II, most nations shared Great Britain's desire for
government regulation of international air service. 49 While the U.S. airline
industry had prospered during the war, European airlines, many of them
39. Id. at 545-46.
40. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Powers Respecting Air
Transport, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1701.
41. Id. The following is an example of a beyond right: Delta Airlines at one time
offered flights from New York City to Frankfurt, Germany, in accordance with the terms
of an open skies agreement between the United States and Germany. From Frankfurt,
these flights continued onto Bombay (Mumbai), India. Under the agreement, Germany
could not restrict Delta's right to carry passengers and cargo between Frankfurt and
Bombay (Mumbai). Id.
42. Id. at 546.
43. Baliles, supra note 6, at 8; Goo, supra note 36, at 548.
44. Baliles, supra note 6, at 8.
45. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Service Between their Respective
Territories, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K., 60 Stat. 1499.
46. Goo, supra note 36, at 545-48; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open
Skies": The Deregulation of International Air Transport, 15 TRANSP. L. J. 305, 315-16
(1987).
47. Dempsey, supra note 46, at 316-17.
48. Id. at 316.
49. Goo, supra note 36, at 545.
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state-owned, had been decimated and faced the challenge of rebuilding.50
As a result, British negotiators sought to create a restrictive agreement,
which they hoped would allow their nation's war-ravaged airline industry
an opportunity to recover and grow, rather than suffer in the face of heavy
competition from U.S. carriers.5 '
While economic fears undoubtedly led to the Chicago Convention and
the subsequent Bermuda I agreement, national security concerns may also
have played a role.52 The Chicago Convention came near the end of World
War II, which saw aerial warfare rise to new heights, and witnessed previ-
ously unimaginable levels of destruction inflicted by military aircraft. 53
According to one commentator, as a result of the recent devastation, "It is
no wonder that national security considerations played as great of a role as
economic protectionism, in making absolute state sovereignty the basic
legal premise of public international air law." 5 4 While the United States
and Britain remained close allies, their agreement still created a precedent
helping to promote this principle.
Under the terms of Bermuda I and similar agreements that followed,
the airlines of each nation could operate service only to and from desig-
nated gateway cities in each country.55 Although Bermuda I allowed air-
lines to operate an unlimited number of flights, the agreement left
responsibility for fare determination in the hands of the International Air
Transport Association (IATA). 56 In addition, while the airlines were free to
set their own flight schedules, each nation retained the right of ex post facto
review of the other's airline operations. 57 Provisions in Bermuda I and its
progeny required that the "interest of the air carriers of the other govern-
ment shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the ser-
vices which the latter provides on all or part of the same route."58
The United States subsequently negotiated Bermuda I-style agree-
ments with most of the seventy-five nations with which it had established
aviation relations.5 9 Meanwhile, around the world, other nations modeled
their own international aviation accords in the image of Bermuda 1.60 Such
restrictive agreements allowed these nations to develop their aviation
50. Id.
51. Dempsey, supra note 46, at 312.
52. Vamos-Goldman, supra note 32, at 430.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Dempsey, supra note 46, at 317-18.
56. Id. at 318. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is composed of
airlines certified to offer scheduled operations. Historically, this organization dealt pri-
marily with fare determination on international routes. However, IATA also focuses on
international civil aviation from technical, legal, and financial standpoints. Id. at
314-15.
57. Dempsey, supra note 46, at 317-18.
58. Id. at 317 (citing United States Standard Form of Bilateral Air Transport Agree-
ment, art. 8-10 (1953)).
59. Dempsey, supra note 46, at 316. Most of these subsequent agreements took the
form of executive agreements rather than treaties. Unlike treaties, executive agreements
do not require the approval of the U.S. Senate before they take effect. Id.
60. Baliles, supra note 6, at 8.
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industries at their own paces, free from the forces of unchecked economic
competition. 6 1 This system of restrictive, individually negotiated bilateral
aviation treaties did not impose a serious impediment to economic growth
because a small number of people traveled by air during the early decades
of the post-war era, 62 and because of the primitive state of aviation technol-
ogy, which limited the practicality of long-haul international air service.
6 3
II. The Flight Path to Open Skies
A. Untenable Agreements
As world aviation markets developed during the ensuing decades, the
system of restrictive agreements modeled after Bermuda I became increas-
ingly untenable. Gerald L. Baliles, the chair of the National Airline Com-
mission during the early months of the Clinton Administration, noted that
the old system of agreements "represent[s] a global regulatory morass that
has the ultimate effect of managing trade in basic transportation in order to
maintain major countries' market share and protect home carriers and
labor forces." 64
Furthermore, Bermuda I ceased to exist.65 Great Britain renounced
the agreement in 1976 and negotiated an even more restrictive treaty
known as Bermuda 11.66 Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Howard
Cannon (D-Nev.) described Bermuda II as "the greatest step backward in
forty years of attempting to bring market-oriented competition to interna-
tional aviation."'67 In addition to wiping out U.S. carriers' beyond rights,
which under Bermuda I had allowed them to fly between Britain and
points in Continental Europe, Bermuda II reduced the number of U.S. car-
riers permitted to fly to London's sought-after Heathrow Airport to two.6 8
Bermuda II helped give rise to British Airways' domination over the transat-
lantic market, and, by 1997, allowed British carriers to capture more than
sixty percent of U.S.-Britain passenger traffic.6 9 Bermuda II, however,
came as an anomaly in an era marked by movement toward airline
deregulation.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. For example, in 1949, shortly before China's Communist takeover, Pan Am's
U.S.-China operations consisted of a single weekly flight, departing Los Angeles at 7:45
p.m. Thursday and arriving in Shanghai at 3:15 p.m. Sunday. En route, this flight made
stops in Honolulu, Wake Island, and Tokyo, Japan for servicing and refueling. PAN
AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS SYSTEM TIME TABLE, May 1,
1949, at 2.
64. Baliles, supra note 6, at 8.
65. Dempsey, supra note 46, at 331.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 332.
68. Lick, supra note 17, at 1264. The two American carriers are American Airlines
and United Airlines. Id.
69. Id. United Airlines claims that Bermuda II has cost the United States "billions of
dollars in revenue and thousands of jobs." Id.
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B. The Birth of Deregulation
The recent trend toward open skies agreements began not with liberali-
zation of the international air market, but rather with U.S. enactment of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.70 Prior to the passage of the Airline Der-
egulation Act, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) maintained tight control
over the U.S. airline industry, awarding new routes and permitting fare
adjustments with deliberate hesitancy. 71 Airlines seeking the right to serve
new routes or alter their fare structures had to petition the CAB, which
would then solicit input from adversely affected carriers before rendering a
decision. 72
Following the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act, the CAB loos-
ened its grip on the industry, granting airlines full freedom to select
domestic routes by the end of 1981, and dropping all domestic fare regula-
tions by the end of the following year. 73 The CAB itself ceased to exist by
the mid-1980s.74 Between 1978 and 1999, in the aftermath of deregula-
tion, inflation-adjusted fares fell twenty-seven percent 75 while passenger
counts rose from just under 275 million air travelers in 197876 to more
than 665 million in the year 2000.7 7
The impact of deregulation spilled over into international aviation
markets as well. Pleased with the initial success of deregulation, the Carter
Administration, in conjunction with the CAB, granted several U.S. airlines
new authority to serve international markets in the 1970s. 78 In the U.S.-
London market, the CAB awarded new routes to Braniff and Delta Airlines,
both of which had not previously flown transatlantic routes. 79 At the same
time, the CAB finished reviewing several airline route petitions, which led
to decisions granting United Airlines a Pacific Northwest-Tokyo route, and
several new carriers the rights to serve the Philadelphia-Bermuda market.80
70. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
provisions of 49 U.S.C.).
71. T. A. HEPPENHEIMER, TURBULENT SKIES: THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION,
315-16 (1995).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 319-20.
74. Id.
75. Virginia Postrel, Don't Blame Deregulation for Airline Problems; Blame Not Enough
Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2000, at C2 (citing a study conducted by Northeastern
University economist Steven A. Morrison and Brookings Institution economist Cliford
Winston).
76. BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, THE OFFICE OF AIRLINE INFO., HISTORICAL AIR TRAF-
FIC STATISTICS: ANNUAL 1954-1980, at http://www.bts.gov/oai/indicators/airtraffic/
annual/i 954-1980.html.
77. HISTORICAL AIR TRAFFIC STATISTICS: ANNUAL 1981-2000, supra note 28.
78. Dempsey, supra note 46, at 329-30.
79. Id. at 330. However, under the terms of Bermuda 1I, Delta and Braniff could not
serve Heathrow airport. They were, therefore, relegated to using London's secondary
airport-Gatwick. Id.
80. Id. at 339.
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III. Open Skies Emerge
The United States signed its first open skies agreement in October
1992 with the Netherlands.8 1 The agreement came as the first in a series
of open skies agreements advocated by U.S. Secretary of Transportation
Andrew Card earlier that year. 8 2 Card proposed initially establishing open
skies agreements with all European nations with the hope that other
nations would follow suit and enter into similar agreements. 8 3 These
agreements granted all airlines of signatory nations nearly unrestricted
marketplace freedom, including the right to offer any number of flights
and level of capacity on routes between the nations.8 4 Additionally, these
early open skies agreements eliminated restrictions on beyond rights.
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The agreements also virtually eliminated fare restrictions, instead imple-
menting "double-disapproval pricing." Under this scheme, rejection of an
airline's fare structure required disapproval by both nations party to the
agreement.8 6 Furthermore, open skies agreements allowed airlines to form
strategic alliances with their foreign counterparts in order to provide
enhanced service between the United States and European nations.8 7
By the middle of 1998, the United States had negotiated open skies
agreements with thirteen European nations, and forty percent of all trans-
atlantic traffic traveled on flights operated under open skies agreements.88
England and France, however, remained notable exceptions, not becoming
parties to open skies agreements. 89 The United States also launched an
effort to establish open skies agreements with its non-European aviation
partners, including a 1995 agreement with Canada. 90 Additionally, the
United States implemented agreements with nations in South America,
Asia, and Oceania, including, Peru, Malaysia, Taiwan, and New Zealand. 9 1
By early 2002, the United States had entered into open skies agreements
81. Goo, supra note 36, at 552.
82. See id. at 550-51.
83. Id. at 551.
84. See Gilbert Fisher, Note, 1998 Amendment to the U.S.-Japan Civil Air Transport
Agreement: The Battle May be Won, but the War for Open Skies is Far from Over, 9 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 327, 331 (2000). Open skies agreements are said to incorporate, at a
minimum, the first five freedoms contained in the Chicago Convention. Id.
85. Goo, supra note 36, at 551.
86. Id. This applies to third and fourth freedom markets. Id.
87. Lick, supra note 17, at 1216-17.
88. Id. at 1215-18.
89. Id. at 1216, 1218. Great Britain has a history of restrictive aviation agreements
with the United States that significantly benefited its major carrier, British Airways. Id.
at 1264. The United States reached a new aviation agreement with France in 1998. See
id. at 1216. Although the treaty falls short of previously negotiated open skies agree-
ments because it fails to provide unlimited beyond rights, it removes all capacity controls
on U.S.-France flights over a five-year period. See Michael A. Taverna & Pierre Sparaco,
U.S., France Approve Long-Awaited Bilateral, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 13, 1998,
at 60. Part of France's resistance to an immediate elimination of capacity controls and
beyond rights restrictions may lie with the fact that French airlines lack the capacity to
expand their operations so as to take full advantage of an open skies agreement. Id.
90. David Biederman, Eyes on China's Skies, TRAFFIC WORLD, Feb. 8, 1999, at 37;
Lick, supra note 17, at 1218-19.
91. Lick, supra note 17, at 1219-20.
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with fifty-six nations, 9 2 including a first-of-its-kind multilateral agreement
with Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, which allowed the airlines
of each country to fly between the five nations without restrictions.9 3
A. The Benefits of Open Skies
Open skies agreements thus far appear to have had their desired
effects. A 2000 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) report indicated
that average fares fell by twenty percent between 1996 and 1999 in U.S.-
Europe open skies markets. 9 4 In U.S.-Europe markets not operated under
open skies agreements, the DOT report found that fares during the same
period declined by little more than ten percent. 95 Additionally, the DOT
report found that total passenger traffic between the United States and
Europe rose by more than fifty percent between 1992 and 1999, with the
greater part of the increase occurring between 1997 and 1999, after a sig-
nificant number of open skies agreements had come into effect.9 6 The
DOT report further noted that airlines that formed alliances with foreign
airlines in the wake of open skies agreements enjoyed substantially higher
traffic growth than those carriers that did not form such alliances. 9 7
Another study concluded that in European markets and beyond, allied car-
riers charged fares averaging twenty-five percent less than those charged by
non-allied airlines serving identical markets. 98
The 1995 U.S.-Canada agreement also proved quite successful. Prior
to the inauguration of the agreement, U.S.-Canada passenger traffic had
grown at an annual rate of 1.5 percent, whereas, following the agreement,
growth skyrocketed to eleven percent.9 9
92. Daniel Dombey & Mark Odell, EU Court Finding Threatens 'Open Skies' Agree-
ments: Efforts to Consolidate Fragmented Airline Sector May be Boosted, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2002, at 1. However, a recent ruling by the European Court of Justice could jeopardize
open skies agreements already in effect between the United States and EU members.
Mark Landler, Europe's Highest Court Voids Air Treaties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002 at C1.
The Court ruled that the treaties are void because under EU law, individual EU members
cannot negotiate bilateral treaties with foreign nations. Id. While the various open skies
agreements will remain in effect until the United States and EU members can negotiate
new ones, the Court's ruling raises the possibility that the United States may seek to
conclude a U.S.-EU open skies treaty to take the place of the previously negotiated indi-
vidual agreements. See id.
93. Aviation Pact Lifts Flight, Price Restrictions For Pacific Rim, supra note 22.
94. U.S. DOT REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 4.
97. Id. at 5-9.
98. Jan K. Bruekner & W. Tom Whalen, The Price Effects of International Airline
Alliances, 43 J. L. & ECON. 503, 542 (2000). According to the author's study, allied
carriers coordinate their schedules with one another and offer cooperative pricing
which minimizes operational inefficiencies, thus allowing the allied carriers to reduce
fares further, and as a result, draw even more passenger traffic. Id. at 504, 542.
99. See Biederman, supra note 90, at 37 (quoting Rep. Jim Oberstar, senior Demo-
crat on the House Transportation Committee and former Chairman of the House Sub-
committee on Aviation).
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B. Not All Airlines Win Under Open Skies
Clearly, that which benefits the traveling public is not always in every
airline's best interest. Some airlines will thrive in the competitive environ-
ment created by open skies agreements, while others will undoubtedly fail.
Because most of today's open skies agreements are only a few years old, it
is difficult to judge their long-term impact upon the affected airlines. Per-
haps the best indicator of open skies agreements' long-term effects is the
experience of U.S. airlines in the aftermath of deregulation, more than
twenty years ago.
Although the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 solely affected domestic
airline service, parallels between it and open skies agreements abound.
Under both schemes, airlines may fly where they choose when they wish,
and charge any fare for their service. The absolute freedom of deregulation
prompted some U.S. airlines, including American, United, and Delta Air-
lines to prosper as they adjusted to the newly deregulated environment by
building hub and spoke route networks that made it possible for them to
transport passengers virtually anywhere in the country. 10 0 Other carriers,
notably aviation pioneer Pan Am, could not adapt to the new system, and
after many painful years, went out of business. 10 1 Just as important, the
successful carriers avoided the costly labor that other carriers experienced,
such as Eastern Airlines, which, along with Pan Am, closed its doors in the
early 1990S.102 Thus, as with deregulation in the U.S. domestic market, a
shift toward open skies in the U.S.-China market carries with it the poten-
tial to force some airlines out of the industry.
IV. The United States and China
During the years leading up to the 1999 amendments, the U.S. and
Chinese airline industries were a study in contrast. The U.S. airlines had
enjoyed handsome profits for several years, while the Chinese airlines
struggled to cut losses and deal with issues as fundamental as safety.
Against this backdrop, the Chinese government was reluctant to open up
any of its air travel market to free competition.
100. HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 71, at 341.
101. See, e.g., ROBERT GANDT, SKYGODs: THE FALL OF PAN AM (1995). When deregula-
tion took effect, Pan Am operated almost no domestic routes within the continental.
United States, having traditionally flown overseas routes exclusively. Following deregu-
lation, Pan Am's overseas routes suffered as carriers like American, United, and Delta,
made inroads into these markets, and used their hub and spoke networks to feed traffic
into them. Id. In the early 1980s, Pan Am acquired National Airlines in an attempt to
establish a domestic network to bolster its international operations. However, Pan Am's
weak financial position soon forced it to sell off other assets. Id. The airline sold its
Pacific Division, including its China routes, to United Airlines for $750 million in 1985,
and ceased operations completely in 1991. Id.
102. Id.
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A. Chinese Airlines: A Turbulent History
Although home to more than 1.2 billion people,' 0 3 China does not yet
have an aviation market to match its population. 10 4 Prior to 1988, when
the CAAC relinquished its monopoly on Chinese airline service and
authorized the formation of semi-autonomous airlines, it functioned in a
manner similar to the former Soviet Union's Aeroflot. 10 5 Best known
among its few passengers for poor service, unreliable schedules, and a dis-
astrous safety record, 10 6 the CAAC earned nicknames like "China Airlines
Always Cancels," and "China Airlines Always Crashes."'1 7 Today, the
CAAC retains regulatory oversight over the rapidly expanding airline
industry. Chinese airlines, which carried slightly more than eleven and a
half million passengers during 1987, the final year of the CAAC monop-
oly," ° 8 grew to carry approximately sixty-one million passengers in
1995.109 Although passenger traffic growth stagnated for several years
during the late 1990s, 110 in 1999, the total number of passengers carried
by Chinese airlines remained near sixty million."' Nevertheless, the IATA
forecasts that China's total number of airline passengers will reach 291.5
million by 2010,112 while the Boeing Company predicts that by 2020,
China's civil aviation market will grow to become second only to that of the
United States. 113
Chinese airlines have struggled in recent years with both safety and
economic issues. 1 4 Rapid expansion led to a spate of accidents in the
early 1990s that temporarily made Chinese airlines the most dangerous in
the world. 115 Between 1989 and 1994, 642 people died in accidents
involving Chinese airlines, although safety has improved considerably
since then as the result of aggressive government-sponsored efforts.1 1 6
Nevertheless, the traveling public's safety fears linger. Despite Chinese air-
103. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 27.
104. Despite having a population four times larger than that of the U.S., China gener-
ates approximately one tenth the number of air passengers each year. Id.; see China
Forecasts Need For 900 Aircraft for Its Carriers, supra note 28; HISTORICAL AIR TRAFFIC
STATISTICS ANNUAL: 1981-2000, supra note 29.
105. Anthony Vandyk, Air China: New Name, New Heights, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD,
Feb. 1991, at 54-55.
106. See Less-Safe Skies: Asian Airlines are Working On It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
4, 1999, at 1, 12-13; Lena H. Sun, In China, Flying is Test of Valor, WASH. POST, Dec. 8,
1993, at A25.
107. Sun, supra note 106, at A28.
108. CAAC Boosts Fleet with Advanced Aircraft, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEws SERVICE,
Dec. 28, 1987, LEXIS, News Library.
109. Asia/Pacific Growth Slows But Will Double Rest of World, ATAG Says, AVIATION
DAILY, July 22, 1997, at 127 [hereinafter Asia/Pacific Growth Slows]; Fisher, supra note
84, at 329.
110. China Forecasts Need for 900 Aircraft for Its Carriers, supra note 28, at 5.
111. Id.
112. Fisher, supra note 84, at 329.
113. Boeing Predicts China Civil-Aviation Market Will be World's Second Largest,
CHINAONLINE, Sept. 24, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
114. Smith, supra note 5, at C2.
115. Id.
1.16. Less-Safe Skies: Asian Airlines are Working On It, supra note 106, at 1, 12-13.
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lines' improved safety records, many travelers still avoid them due to the
perception that they are less safe than their American competitors. 1t7 Sev-
eral major crashes involving Asian airlines in recent years-including two
involving Chinese airlines in 2002-have only fueled these fears. 118
In more recent years, the stagnation of passenger traffic has contrib-
uted to Chinese airlines' economic losses. The Chinese airline industry
collectively lost $294 million in 1998,119 and another $200 million during
the first six months of 1999120 before rebounding in 2000.121 Despite
profitability in 2000 by some of the larger carriers, the earlier losses
prompted the Chinese government in July 2000 to order a consolidation of
its airline industry. 122 Under its recently finalized plan, nine state-owned
airlines, as well as smaller airlines owned by local government authorities,
are to merge into three large groups of airlines, each headed by one of three
established Chinese carriers: Air China, China Eastern, and China South-
ern.123 Meanwhile, in the United States, the airline industry remained
prosperous through the latter half of the 1990s, posting a net income of
$4.6 billion in 1999.124
All of China's airlines continue to be owned in part by regional or
national government authorities. 125 While the CAAC itself no longer oper-
ates the airlines, and will soon give up its ownership stake in them once the
consolidation process is completed, it has continued to hold them on a
short leash in recent years, dictating matters including merger activity,
route planning, fare determination and aircraft acquisition. In addition to
its order to consolidate the airline industry in 2000, the CAAC called on
Chinese airlines to develop hub and spoke route networks modeled after
117. See Yvan Cohen, Asian Air Crashes Trigger Safety Stir, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Apr. 2, 1998, at 1, 8.
118. See id. The airlines of the P.R.C. should in be confused with Taiwan's China
Airlines, also known for its poor safety record in recent years. See id. However, China's
airlines suffered a spate of accidents in early 2002. A China Northern Airlines plane
crashed into the ocean off the coast of northeastern China, while an Air China flight
plowed into a mountain in South Korea. Analysis: China's Air Safety, BBC NEWS, May 10,
2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1974946.stm. Nearly
250 passengers and crewmembers died in the two accidents. Id.
119. China's Airlines Chalk up 67.5 Million Dollars in Operating Losses, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, July 30, 2000, LEXIS, News Library.
120. See Geoffrey Thomas, China's Long Haul, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Oct. 1, 2000, at
49.
121. China Civil Aviation May Earn Little This Year, XINHUA GEN. NEws SERVICE, Nov. 9,
2000, LEXIS, News Library.
122. Nicholas lonides, Airbus Forecasts 8% Traffic Growth for China, AIR TRANSPORT
INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 17, 2000, LEXIS, News Library.
123. See id. (noting these were the same three Chinese airlines that were already
designated to fly between the U.S. and China); Guo Aibing, Airline Mergers Get Green
Light, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 6, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7167165. In October 2002,
China's State Council finalized the merger plan, which was expected to take a year to
implement. Nicholas lonides, China's State Council Blesses Mergers, AIRLINE BUSINESS,
Nov. 1, 2002, at 27. Under the plan, the CAAC is to give up ownership in the nation's
airlines. Id.
124. BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, THE OFFICE OF AIRLINE INFO., Air Traffic Statis-
tics and Airline Financial Statistics, at http://www.bts.gov/oai/indicators/top.html.
125. Smith, supra note 5, at C2.
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the ones successfully used by U.S. carriers. 126 In the area of fare regula-
tion, the CAAC announced in early 2001 that it would restrict the ability of
airlines to increase their fares to compensate for rising fuel prices.127 The
CAAC took this measure despite evidence that rising ticket prices had only
a negligible effect on demand for domestic air travel in China and despite
fears that higher fuel costs would drive the Chinese airline industry back
toward unprofitability. 128 And, once again trying its hand in aircraft
acquisition policy, in 2000 the CAAC pressured Xinjiang Airlines (one of
many carriers expected to disappear following the industry consolidation)
to purchase several Russian-made lyushin aircraft.' 29 This course of
action came as an about-face from the CAAC's call several months earlier
for Chinese carriers to rid their fleets of Russian aircraft.1 30 The CAAC
has also declared that, in the long-run, it intends to deregulate China's avia-
tion industry. 13'
B. The U.S. Airline Behemoths
Predictably, the turmoil in the Chinese airline industry left the
nation's authorities in no mood to pursue an open skies agreement with
the United States, the largest player in the aviation world. 132 As the
CAAC's Director General for the Department of International Affairs and
Cooperation noted, "You must remember that there are individual airlines
in the U.S. that have a larger fleet than the whole of China."'133
One such carrier was United Airlines, one of the two U.S. passenger
carriers authorized to serve China, which in July 2000 maintained a fleet
of 594 aircraft, 134 or seventy-four more than the total number of aircraft
operated by all the civil carriers in China combined.' 35 Another such car-
rier was FedEx, which operated cargo flights to China, drawing on its fleet
of approximately 650 aircraft. 136 The third and final airline authorized to
126. Nicholas lonides, China Outlines Hub and Spoke Strategy, AiR TRANSPORT INTELI1-
GENC-, Nov. 8, 2000, LEXIS, News Library. In addition to calling on Chinese Airlines to
develop hub and spoke route networks, the CAAC also encouraged the airlines to
acquire a fleet of smaller aircraft necessary to support such a route structure. Id. At the
end of the year 2000, Chinese airlines collectively owned only sixty-two aircraft seating
less than seventy passengers. Id.
127. Aviation Board Restricts Fuel-Price Charges for Domestic Air Travel, CHINAONIINE,
Feb. 12, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
128. China Civil Aviation May Earn Little This Year, supra note 121.
129. CAAC, In About-Face, Wants Russian Aircraft For Carriers, AVIATION DAILY, Sept.
14, 2000, at 5.
130. Id.
131. Thomas, supra note 120, at 49-50.
.132. See U.S. Pushes for Go, supra note 30. CAAC's Wang Ronghua stated in October
2000, "[W]e should not lose sight of the fact that the aviation systems of the U.S. and
China are at different levels, and it will take time for China to catch up. It is in all our
best interests that the progress be taken gradually." Id.
133. Id.
134. ATW's World Airline Report 7/2000, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, July 2000, at 10,
available at http://www.atwonline.com.
135. China Forecasts Need for 900 Aircraft for Its Carriers, supra note 28, at 5.
136. ATW's World Airline Report 7/2000, supra note 134, at 10.
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provide U.S.-China service prior to April, 2001 was Northwest Airlines. 13 7
With a fleet of more than 400 aircraft, Northwest continues to operate a
combination of passenger and cargo-only flights to China. 1 38
Although in 2001 the U.S. airline industry plunged into its darkest
hour in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the 1999 amend-
ments to the U.S.-China aviation treaty were negotiated against a backdrop
of U.S. airline prosperity and continued morass in the Chinese airline
industry. United, FedEx, and Northwest Airlines remained highly profita-
ble into the late 1990s, posting annual profits in 1999 of $1.24 billion,
$442 million, and $300 million, respectively. 139 A variety of other statis-
tics, including passenger traffic data and aircraft utilization rates, also
attest to the U.S. airline industry's dominance during the late 1990s. 1 4 0
137. U.S. Pushes For Go, supra note 30.
138. Id.; ATW's World Airline Report 7/2000, supra note 134, at 10.
139. ATW's World Airline Report 7/2000, supra note 134, at 10.
140. In the passenger traffic category, Northwest Airlines reported that during 2000,
its Pacific operations, which included its flights to China, generated nearly twenty-three
billion revenue passenger miles (one RPM equals one passenger flown one mile).
NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORP., INVESTOR RELATIONS, NORTHWEST AIRLINES REPORTS DECEMBER
AND YEAR-END TRAFFIC, Jan. 5, 2001, at http://www.corporate-ir.net/ireye/ir site.zhtml?
ticker=NWAC&script=410&layout=9&itemid=142012. Northwest's Pacific operations
include flights operating between the United States and Asia, as well as intra-Asia
flights; data for Northwest's overall U.S.-China operations was unavailable. See id.
Pacific operations flights operated with an average passenger load factor (percentage of
seats sold) of 81.7%. Id. Load factors are a key measure of an airline's performance; a
high load factor, indicating that an airline sells a high percentage of its available seats,
suggests efficient operations. The load factor on Northwest's bi-weekly Detroit-Shanghai
service, which it launched during the spring of 2000 using newly allocated slots, aver-
aged eighty-five percent during its initial months of operation. NW Non-stop Detroit
Profits, ASIAINFo DAILY CHINA NEWS, July 5, 2000, at 4, LEXIS, News Library. United
Airlines performed similarly during the first six months of 2000 with its Pacific opera-
tions producing 11.5 billion revenue passenger miles, with an average load factor of
70.8%. UAL CORP., UNITED AIRLINES INVESTOR RELATIONS, United Airlines' June Traffic
Increases 6.5% as Passenger Load Factor Surges 5.7%, July 5, 2000, at http://
www.corporate-ir.net (United's Pacific operations include flights operating between the
U.S. and Asia, as well as intra-Asia flights; data for United's U.S.-China operations was
unavailable.) [hereinafter United June Traffic]. FedEx also posted respectable numbers,
carrying an average cargo weight load factor (the percentage of maximum cargo capacity
utilized, measured by weight) of 64.2% on its international flights in 1998. IATA: World
Air Transport Statistics, June 1999, at 91 (data for China-U.S. service unavailable).
By contrast, Chinese airlines' operating statistics did not compare with those of the
U.S. carriers. The three providers of service to the United States-Air China, China
Eastern, and China Southern-generated passenger load factors of 59.6, 58, and 53.1%,
respectively, in 1998 on their international routes. Id. at 60, 79-80 (including all inter-
national service operated by each airline; data for China-U.S. service was unavailable).
While Chinese airlines rarely disclose load factors generated by their transpacific opera-
tions, industry analysts estimated that load factors on these flights averaged only fifty
percent during the late 1990s. Patrick Baert, China Ill-Prepared to Profit from Aviation
Accord with U.S., AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Apr. 8, 1999, LEXIS, News Library. During the
same time period, China's airlines' collective international operations produced approxi-
mately 10.3 billion revenue passenger miles, or less than half of that generated by either
United's or Northwest's Pacific operations in 2000. See id. (converting kilometers to
miles by multiplying each figure by 0.621). More recently, however, China Southern
Airlines reported that during December 2001, its Los Angeles-Guangzhou flights pro-
duced a stunning passenger load factor of ninety percent. China Southern Posts Record
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These statistics illustrate the disparities between the mature and rela-
tively efficient U.S. airline industry and its less experienced Chinese com-
petition. Such disparities lay at the heart of China's resistance to an open
skies agreement with the United States. From the Chinese perspective, the
possibility of greater U.S. airline access to Chinese markets represented a
threat. The Chinese airlines feared they would either be forced to withdraw
from the U.S.-China market, or compete with money-losing service.
V. Amending the U.S.-China Agreement
The 1999 amendments to the U.S.-China aviation treaty represent the
greatest step toward liberalization of the U.S.-China aviation trade since the
original agreement took effect in 1980.141 However, progress prior to 1999
came in smaller increments. 14 2 In the decade that followed implementa-
tion of the 1980 agreement, service gradually expanded until negotiations
led to the 1992 amendments, which authorized a dramatic increase in the
number of flights that each nation's airlines could fly. 143 The United
Passenger Loads on China-U.S. Service, AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 22, 2002. Data from other
Chinese carriers suggests that their load factors may also have risen recently. China
Airlines' Costs from Sept. 11 Attacks Seen at 1.41 Bin. Yuan, AFX-AsIA, Nov. 20, 2001
[hereinafter China Airlines Sept. 11 Costs].
Through the 1990s, aircraft utilization rates also reflected the advantages U.S. carriers
held over their Chinese competitors. A higher utilization rate, as measured by the aver-
age number of hours an aircraft is used each day, generally indicates a more efficient
airline. In 1998, both United and Northwest Airlines operated each of their Boeing 747-
400 aircraft, the workhorses of their U.S.-China operations, an average of more than
twelve hours each day. IATA: World Air Transport Statistics, June 1999, at 109, 126. Air
China, which also relied heavily upon the same type of aircraft in its U.S.-China opera-
tions, utilized each of its 747-400s only slightly -more than nine hours each day. Id. at
60. China Eastern, which used Boeing MD-11's on its U.S.-China flights, operated these
aircraft an average of 9.4 hours each day, while China Southern used each of its Boeing
777's, the mainstay of its international operations, an average of only 7.8 hours per day.
Id. at 79-80. Modern aircraft, which cost in excess of $100 million each, are among the
airlines' most expensive assets. See Semi-Annual Jet AIRCRAFT VALUE Listing, AIRCRAFT
VALUE NEWS, Jan. 15, 2001. In recent years, new Boeing 747-400 and 777-200ER air-
craft, the mainstays of U.S.-China operations, have commanded average prices of
approximately $140 million and $118 million, respectively. Id. The greater the number
of hours an airline keeps its aircraft aloft, earning revenue, the fewer it needs to maintain
a given operation, thereby creating a more efficient airline.
141. The 1999 amendments permitted each nation's airlines to operate an additional
twenty-seven weekly roundtrips, the greatest increase in service allowed by any of the
U.S.-China agreements. See 1999 Amendments, supra note 10, at 5 (allowing fifty-four
frequencies); cf. U.S.-China 1980 Agreement, supra note 5 (allowing two frequencies).
142. The 1992 amendments allowed the United States and China each to increase
their weekly roundtrip flights to twenty-seven, up from the two originally permitted by
the 1980 agreement. See 1992 Amendments, supra note 11, at 11; U.S.-China 1980
Agreement, supra note 5, at 15, 28, 40-41.
143. The 1980 agreement called for the United States and China to discuss, within
two years, implementation of additional service to be operated by a second airline from
each nation. See U.S.-China 1980 Agreement, supra note 5, at 28. The 1992 amend-
ments called for an incremental rise in the number of flights operated by each nation,
from eighteen in 1992 to twenty-seven in 1996. See 1992 Amendments, supra note 11, at
11.
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States and China also agreed to several smaller changes in their agreement
in 1995.
A. Code-Sharing and New Routes
The 1992 amendments authorized Chinese and U.S. airlines to enter
into code-sharing arrangements with one another. 14 4 Under code-sharing
arrangements, one airline operates a flight using its aircraft and crew while
selling blocks of seats on that flight to a second airline. 145 The second
airline, in turn, markets those seats as if it operated the flight itself and
lists the flight in its schedules as its own.14 6 Code-sharing arrangements
help boost traffic in several ways. They prompt participating air carriers to
coordinate connecting flight schedules so that passengers can more easily
complete a journey requiring a change of aircraft. 14 7 Code-sharing also
simplifies the reservations process because rather than purchasing two
separate tickets for each leg of their journey, passengers can buy a single
ticket, as though they are taking a trip involving connecting flights on the
same airline. Frequent flyers also benefit from code-sharing arrangements,
which allow them to earn mileage credit on either airline in the
partnership.
To date, three U.S. carriers have formed code-sharing relationships
with their Chinese counterparts. In 1998, American Airlines launched a
code-sharing arrangement with China Eastern, which operates service
between Los Angeles and Beijing, 14 8 while in 1999, Delta Airlines did the
same with China Southern, which flies between Los Angeles and
Guangzhou. 14 9 Northwest Airlines and Air China also began code-share
service in October 1998 on one another's U.S.-China services. 150
The United States and China revisited their agreement again in 1995.
Their negotiations led to expanded code-sharing opportunities (although
up to that point, no airlines had taken advantage of them in the U.S.-China
market) and authorized Northwest Airlines to inaugurate tri-weekly passen-
ger/cargo combination service between Detroit and Beijing. 15 1 This non-
144. See 1992 Amendments, supra note 11, at 4. The 1999 amendments permitted
the addition of eight additional weekly roundtrip frequencies by each nation's airlines,
effective April 1, 1999, raising the total number of allotted frequencies to thirty-five for
each side. 1999 Amendments, supra note 10, at 5. The amendments granted an addi-
tional nine frequencies to each side on April 1, 2000, and a final ten additional frequen-
cies on April 1, 2001, thereby allowing each nation to operate a total of fifty-four weekly
roundtrip U.S.-China frequencies. Id.
145. Goo, supra note 36, at 562-63.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. U.S. Officials Encouraging China to Expand Aviation Services, STAR TRIB. (Minne-
apolis, Minn.), Dec. 7, 1998, at 4D.
149. Nicholas lonides, China Southern, Delta Finalise Code-Share Pact, AIR TRANSPORT
INTELLIGENCE, Nov. 5, 1998.
150. Id.; U.S. Officials Encouraging China to Expand Aviation Services, supra note 148,
at 4D.
151. Agreement Reached With China Permitting Expanded Air Services, PR NEWSWIRE,
Financial News, Dec. 23, 1995. The frequency of this flight was later increased. Id.
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stop flight, the first operated by a U.S. carrier between the United States
and China, cut several hours from a trip that previously required a change
of planes at Tokyo's congested Narita Airport. 15 2 The agreement also per-
mitted China Southern Airlines to operate the first-ever non-stop service
between Guangzhou and the United States. 15 3
B. The 1999 Amendments
The most recent amendments to the U.S.-China aviation agreement,
signed in April 1999, authorize each nation to operate a maximum of fifty-
four weekly roundtrip flights, effective April 1, 2001.154 The 1999 amend-
ments represent a one-hundred percent increase over the previous amend-
ments of 1992, which authorized the United States and China each to
operate twenty-seven weekly roundtrips.' 55 Also, effective April 1, 2001,
the 1999 amendments permitted each nation to increase the number of
airlines designated to provide U.S.-China service from three to four. 156
The 1999 amendments granted the airlines the freedom to operate service
from any city of their choice in their respective home countries, while also
increasing the number of cities they may serve in the foreign nation.' 5 7
Although the 1999 agreement fell short of the United States' desire for
an open skies accord, at the same time it may have opened up the aviation
trade further than China desired. Whereas four U.S. carriers fought to
become the fourth carrier permitted to operate U.S.-China flights, 158 no
Chinese carriers sought the same opportunity. 15 9 The possibility of a
fourth designated Chinese carrier remains unlikely in the near future due
to the government's plan to consolidate Chinese airlines into three
groups. 160 Air China, China Eastern, and China Southern-the flagship
airlines that are to head the groups-each offered U.S.-China service prior
to the amendments. 161 Airline analyst Peter Haribson of the Centre for
Asia Pacific Aviation noted at the time, "There is little going on in China
over the new slots. They just have other more pressing things on their plate
at the moment. ' 162 The Chinese airline industry, with its financial losses
of recent years, continued to retrench and consolidate in its effort to
achieve long-term profitability, while the U.S. industry sought expansion,
especially in potentially lucrative overseas markets. Industry analysts
believed that only China Southern was in a position to utilize any of the
152. See id.
153. id.
154. 1999 Amendments, supra note 10, at 5.
155. Id.; 1992 Amendments, supra note 11, at 11.
156. 1999 Amendments, supra note 10, at 1.
157. Id. at 3-5.
158. U.S. Majors Go to War Over China, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Mar. 3, 2000. Delta,
American, UPS and Polar Air Cargo were attempting to gain access for the first time. Id.
159. Id.
160. William Dennis, China Faces Severe Airline Restructuring, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 13, 2000, at 41.
161. U.S. Majors Go to War Over China, supra note 158.
162. Id.
Vol. 35
2002 U.S.-China Aviation Relations
slots created by the amendments. 163
In the United States, American Airlines, Delta Airlines, Polar Air
Cargo, and United Parcel Service (UPS) all sought to win the designation as
the fourth U.S. airline to serve China. 164 Each airline presented its case to
the DOT, arguing that its plans for new service using the newly created
slots would produce the greatest benefits. American Airlines' Chairman
Don Carty pitched the benefits of his company's plans to fly non-stop to
China from its Chicago hub. 165 American Airlines' plan would have cre-
ated same-airline service between eighty U.S. communities and China, he
said, noting that, "No other carrier comes close."'166 Delta Airlines' Chair-
man Leo Mullin contended that his airline's proposed service between New
York City and China would fill a "glaring omission" in the U.S.-China mar-
ket.' 67 Polar Air Cargo argued that its planned cargo services would serve
a greater public interest than the addition of new passenger service.168 Cit-
ing a need for greater competition in the cargo market, the DOT ultimately
awarded the new designation to UPS and granted it six of the final ten
slots.' 69 The DOT split the remaining four slots, handing two to United
Airlines, and one each to Northwest Airlines and FedEx. 170
At approximately the same time, the U.S. and Chinese governments
invited American and Delta Airlines to discuss the possibility of "wet-lease"
agreements with their respective code-share partners.'71 Under the propo-
sal, which appears unlikely to come to fruition, China Eastern and China
Southern would have leased an aircraft and its crew from American and
Delta, respectively.' 72 These flights would operate using slots granted to
the Chinese carriers, which they are currently unable to utilize, but the
U.S. carriers would use their own aircraft and codes. 173
163. Id. During January 2001, China Southern's passenger load factor on its Los
Angeles-Guangzhou flight averaged eighty percent, suggesting that it is more likely to
grow than other Chinese airlines with lower load factors in the U.S.-China market. See
CHINA SOUTHERN Airlines Reports Strong January 2001; 80% Transpacific PAX Loads
Between LAX & Guangzhou; 91% Economy PAX, Bus. Wire, Feb. 6, 2001, LEXIS, News
Library.
164. UPS Comes Out on Top for Chinese Air Space, TRANSP. & DISTRIBUTION., Jan. 1,
2001, at 13.
165. U.S. Majors Go to War Over China, supra note 158.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. U.S.-China Air Services, DOT Order 2001-1-6 (Jan. 5, 2001). In its decision the
DOT stated, "[W]e have found that the public interest is best served by affording the
public the benefit of another airline service, particularly in the all-cargo market ... At
the same time, we recognized the continuing unmet demand for additional service from
the incumbent carriers and the public benefits that would result from expanded service
by each of them." Id.
170. Id.
171. DEP'T OF TRANSP., U.S. Transportation Secretary Slater Calls for Liberalization of
U.S.-China Aviation Rights, Announces Tentative Decision on New Services, FED. DEP'T AND
AGENCY DOCUMENTS (DOT), Nov. 21, 2000 [hereinafter Slater Calls for Liberalization].
172. Id.
173. Id.
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C. The Aftermath of September 11
The events of September 11, 2001 dealt a blow of unparalleled propor-
tions to the U.S. airline industry. Following the attacks, U.S. carriers sus-
pended all flight operations for two days due to security concerns. 174
When flights resumed, passenger counts plummeted. 175 This disaster
came on the heels of a downturn in the U.S. economy that had already
driven most airlines' bottom lines deep into the red. 176 To prevent the
industry's collapse, the federal government funded a $15 billion bailout
consisting of a combination of grants and loans. 177 In the weeks that fol-
lowed September 11, most carriers pared their workforces, fleets, and
flight schedules by twenty percent or more. 178 Even some China flights
did not escape the axe. United Airlines announced a temporary suspen-
sion of its Chicago-Beijing flight,179 while Northwest Airlines discontinued
its non-stop flight between Detroit and Shanghai, and later, its non-stop
flights between Detroit and Beijing.180
On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, Chinese airlines also suffered
the consequences of September 11. For several days following the attacks,
Chinese carriers suspended their U.S. operations as U.S. airspace was off
limits to all carriers."8 t When flights resumed, they too experienced
diminished passenger counts, and incurred additional costs associated
with new security measures, and the increased cost of insurance for their
aircraft. 18 2 In 2001, China's three flagship carriers sustained a narrow
loss of just under $10 million, 183 but industry officials predicted that
losses would rise to several hundred million dollars in 2002.184 Neverthe-
less, while U.S. carriers pared some China service, Chinese carriers gradu-
ally added service. Air China inaugurated tri-weekly non-stop flights
between New York City and Beijing beginning in September 2002, using
available slots under the existing open skies agreement.'8 5 During the
174. James F. Peitz et al., Reflections on 2001: One Day Redefined Business as Usual,
L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 2001, at C2.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See United Airlines to Add 127 Flights in April, CHANNEL NEWsAsIA, Feb. 2, 2002,
Corporate News, LEXIS, News Library.
180. John Gallagher, NWA to Lay Off 10,000, Cut Late-Night Flights, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Sept. 22, 2001, Business and Financial News. This flight became a connecting
route through Narita, Japan. Id. Although no news release is available regarding the
discontinuance of Detroit-Beijing flights, several airline reservations systems indicate
that Northwest no longer offers such flights. See, e.g., http://www. travelocity.com (last
visited Sept. 15, 2002).
181. Gallagher, supra note 180, at 10.
182. Id.
183. Top Three Airlines Lose U.S. $9.66 Million in 2001, CHINAONLINE, Jan. 25, 2002,
LEXIS, News Library.
184. Id.; Alice Yuan, China's 3 Biggest Airlines to Post $404 Mln. Loss, Report Says,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 8, 2002, LEXIS, News Library.
185. Air China Readies Direct NYC Flights, CHINA DAILY, July 26, 2002, at http://
wwwlchinadaily.com.cn/news/2002-07-26/79605.html.
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same month, China Southern launched tri-weekly cargo flights between
Los Angeles and Guangzhou, supplementing its four-time-a-week passenger
service on the same route.' 8 6 And in October, Air China once again
boosted service, adding a two-time-a-week cargo flight between Portland,
Oregon and Beijing. 18 7
Although Chinese airlines have sustained losses in recent years, they
pale in comparison to those suffered by the U.S. airline industry, which in
2001, by a staggering margin, suffered its worst year in history, with collec-
tive losses exceeding $7 billion. 188 United Airlines alone sustained a loss
of $2.1 billion, the largest ever incurred by a single carrier, prompting
some airline observers to speculate that the company would be forced to
seek bankruptcy protection.' 8 9 As 2002 drew to a close, the outlook for
the U.S. airline industry remained bleak, as the Air Transport Association
predicted record industry losses of $8 billion for the year. 190 Although for
the wrong reasons, these recent events may have somewhat leveled the play-
ing field on which the U.S. and Chinese airline industries compete.
VI. New Horizons
While the pressure to expand U.S.-China operations may have sub-
sided post-September 11, this situation will likely be temporary. Despite
the calamities of 2001, the U.S. airline industry will probably recover and
grow along with a rebounding economy. In the long run, demands for
expanded service to China are a near certainty. Even though the U.S. air-
line industry's short-term situation may be precarious, this is not cause to
neglect planning for long-term growth, and the open skies agreements such
growth will require.
Furthermore, although events have provided a reminder that the U.S.
airline industry is not invincible, the Chinese airlines have begun to show
186. China Southern Launches LAX Cargo Flights, PACIFIC Bus. NEWS, Sept. 4, 2002, at
http://pacific.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2002/09/02/daily31.html.
187. Jeffrey Kosseff, PDX Secures Freight Flights to Beijing on Air China Cargo, THE
OREGONIAN, Oct. 2, 2002, at El.
188. Terry Maxon, With Airline Losses at a High, Analyst Suggests Buying Stocks, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 11, 2002, at ID; see also Kristin S. Krause, The Worst, By Far:
After Years of Wealth, Major Airlines' Losses for 2001 to Nearly Double 1992's Previous
Low, TRAFFIC WORLD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 34.
189. Laurence Zuckerman, United Airlines Loss for 2001 Breaks Record, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2002, at C2. This loss reflects additional income that United received as part of
the federal airline bailout. Id. Speculation regarding a possible United Airlines bank-
ruptcy increased further in late summer of 2002 as the airline struggled to negotiate
wage cuts with its employees. Fear Rises of United Airlines Collapse, BBC NEWS, Aug. 30,
2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2225331.stm. Other U.S. Car-
riers also struggled. U.S. Airways, the sixth largest U.S. carrier, filed for bankruptcy
protection in August 2002. At the same time American Airlines, the world's largest car-
rier, announced mass job cuts and a cancellation of new aircraft orders. United Air-
lines Warns of Bankruptcy BBC NEWS, Aug. 14, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/business/2194297.stm.
190. Make That $8 Billion-Projected U.S. Airline Losses, PACIFIC Bus. NEWS,
Sept. 26, 2002, available at http://pacific.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2002/09/23/
daily69.html.
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some indications of their own potential. For example, during the first eight
months of 2001, Chinese airlines reported that average passenger load fac-
tors, or percentage of seats filled, were nearly seventy-five percent on their
U.S. flights. t 9 1 And, despite the industry's collective financial losses in
2001, Air China posted a slim profit of slightly more than $4 million.192
Ongoing consolidation within the Chinese airline industry should boost
the long run viability of the remaining carriers. The day may come when
the Chinese government has less need to protect its no longer fledgling
airline industry from the U.S. behemoths.
Like many prior agreements, dating back to Bermuda I, the 1999
amendments to the U.S.-China bilateral agreement unnecessarily restrict
the expansion of international air service. By limiting growth, the agree-
ment does not properly serve the interests of either nation. Evidence
strongly indicates that around the world, improved air service promotes
economic growth and benefits the communities it serves. 193 The benefits
range from increased passenger traffic and jobs at airports, to increased
tourism and long-term job growth as businesses and industry, attracted by
the advantages of convenient air service, expand their operations. 194
Although not all airlines will benefit equally from a shift toward open skies
in the U.S.-China market, this alone is not a reason to preserve a
hodgepodge of aviation agreements that reflect the needs of a bygone era.
Today's world economy, with its growing reliance on international trade,
depends heavily upon the existence of a market-driven airline service. 195
A. The U.S. Perspective
Under the current U.S.-China agreement, U.S. interests remain unful-
filled, from a national economic perspective and probably from an airline
industry perspective as well. While U.S. airlines would stand to gain from
an open skies agreement with China, such an agreement would create
some economic uncertainty inherently associated with a transition from a
191. China Airlines' Sept. 11 Costs, supra note 140. Of course, load factors may not
provide an accurate reflection of profitability; fares may be too low, and cost structures
too high, for a carrier to earn a profit, even while flying at capacity. See id. Information
regarding revenue yields and operating costs are very difficult to obtain. Id.
192. Top Three Airlines Lose $9.66 Million in 2001, supra note 183.
193. For example, the growth of commercial aviation has given rise to a booming
worldwide tourism industry, which in the 1990s accounted for more than twelve percent
of global consumer spending and $3.5 trillion in combined gross national product. See
Vamos-Goldman, supra note 32, at 440. Additionally, commercial aviation provides an
essential conduit for the transport of high value goods, which in 1999 made up forty
percent of global trade, as measured by value. See Brookings Economist, supra note 29.
194. See Rep. Jim Oberstar, Oberstar Undertakes Mission to China, FED. Doc. CLEAR-
ING HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES, Jan. 8, 1999.
195. Alan Larson, U.S. State Department Undersecretary and Acting Deputy of the
National Economic Council of Economic Affairs, recently commented, "Aviation is a
facilitative industry in that it supports the rest of the economy. In many ways, air ser-
vice and connections lead investment into regions and cities." China Says Slow, U.S.
Pushes Fast Cargo Access, WORLD AIRPORT WK., Nov. 7, 2000, 2000 WL 6771821 therein-
after U.S. Pushes Fast Cargo Access].
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regulated environment to an open market. 196 Just as some airlines pros-
pered while others failed in the aftermath of deregulation of the U.S. airline
industry, a U.S.-China open skies agreement could also have an impact on
airlines' bottom lines. However, despite growth in international markets,
the consequences would not be as substantial as the effects of deregulation
in the United States because U.S. carriers continue to do most of their busi-
ness at home.19 7 At worst, some U.S. carriers could be forced to withdraw
from the U.S.-China market if their operations became consistently unprof-
itable. However, that appears unlikely, as U.S. carriers still possess a com-
petitive advantage over their Chinese counterparts.
B. The Chinese Perspective
The 1999 amendments also fail to serve the interests of China's econ-
omy. Improved air service under an open skies agreement would benefit
the Chinese economy, regardless of whether American or Chinese airlines
provide the service. However, the impact of an open skies agreement upon
Chinese airlines is less certain. Their interests lie in building consistently
profitable operations before they compete directly with U.S. carriers. Few,
if any, Chinese airlines currently have the desire and capability to utilize
the new route created by the 1999 amendments effectively.1 9 8 This could
change in the future, but it is not a certainty. One could imagine a scena-
rio under the existing bilateral treaty in which Chinese airlines never attain
lasting profitability, yet stay in business with the aid of government subsi-
dies. Even though a government subsidized and controlled airline industry
should not preclude an open skies agreement, it is difficult to imagine the
Chinese government allowing unfettered competition against its marginal
airline industry. 199 A continued protectionist agreement would guarantee
the Chinese airlines a place in the U.S.-China market. Apart from that ben-
efit-if it can be called a benefit given that the profitability Chinese airlines'
196. Consider the shake-up that ensued in the airline industry following U.S. deregu-
lation in 1978; some carriers failed, while others, notably United, American, and Delta
Airlines, grew to dominate the U.S. aviation market. See HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 71, at
345-46.
197. For example, United Airlines' North American operations produce approxi-
mately four times as many RPM's as its Pacific operations. See United June Traffic, supra
note 140.
198. Baert, suPRA note 140. A spokesman for one airline said that China's air carriers
do not currently have the sufficient number of long-range aircraft necessary to expand
their U.S.-China operations. Id.
199. See Dempsey, supra note 46, at 381-88 (stating that "[To assume that the same
free market principles [as used in the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry] would
work as well internationally, in an industry so dominated by government ownership and
subsidization, was to foster theory at the expense of reality." ). Id. Additionally, some
Chinese leaders may be wary of the open skies agreement based on their perception of
the U.S. experience following deregulation of its airline industry. They may side with
critics of the U.S. deregulation experience, who argue that deregulation has led to
declining profitability in the airline industry, increasing numbers of airline bankrupt-
cies, lack of stable employment opportunities for airline employees, and lower levels of
passenger satisfaction. See, e.g., Laurie Schoder, Note, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The
Effect of Airline Deregulation on Labor Relations, 22 TRANsP. L. J. 105, 106 (1994).
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U.S.-China operations remains uncertain-it is difficult to imagine that
Chinese airlines would gain any advantage from a continued protectionist
agreement.
Furthermore, government officials who fear the demise of Chinese air-
lines under an open skies agreement lack grounds for their belief. Even
under an open skies agreement as advocated by the United States, Chinese
carriers would retain complete control of the Chinese domestic market.
The United States and China prohibit cabotage, a practice in which an air-
line provides domestic service in a nation other than its home nation. 200
The Chicago Convention affirms a nation's right to outlaw cabotage within
its borders. 20 1 Only in emergencies has the United States wavered from its
firm opposition to the practice. 202 Given this background, it is difficult to
imagine the United States demanding, let alone obtaining, cabotage rights
in China. On the other hand, it is conceivable that an open skies agree-
ment with China could include beyond rights because most agreements
bearing the "open skies" label include such rights. However, even if an
agreement included a beyond rights provision, past experience suggests
that airlines would seldom utilize these rights. 203
The Chinese government should be less concerned with the competi-
tiveness of its airlines in the U.S.-China market, and more concerned with
ensuring sufficient aviation links with the rest of the world. Having ade-
quate international air service is more important than which airlines pro-
vide that service. Although globetrotting airlines flying their national flags
around the world are a source of pride for their homeland governments,
the economic benefits associated with free aviation markets, although
sometimes less glamorous, are more important. The Chinese government
has little to fear under an open skies agreement. Even under the worst of
scenarios, Chinese carriers would merely lose out to the U.S. competition
on their U.S.-China routes. But even that scenario appears less likely in
light of the U.S. airline industry's ongoing financial distress.
Although individuals with a direct stake in the Chinese airline indus-
try might not win under an open skies agreement, nearly everyone else
including tourists, business travelers, and anyone who gains from an
200. See Adam L. Schless, Open Skies: Loosening the Protectionist Grip on International
Civil Aviation, 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 435, 452-53 (1994); Joseph Lo, Open-Shies Path May
Clip HK's Wings, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 31, 2001, at 18.
201. Howard E. Kass, Note, Cabotage and Control: Bringing 1938 U.S. Aviation Policy
into the Jet Age, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'l. L. 143, 152 (1994).
202. Id. at 156-57. In a rare exception to its policy, the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation granted permission to Australia's Qantas Airlines to transport a shipment of live
camels from Honolulu to Los Angeles. Id. The camels had become stranded in Hono-
lulu after another airline ceased operations and no other U.S. carrier was willing to
transport the camels. Id.
203. A quick browse through most airlines' flight schedules will confirm this. A nota-
ble exception exists in Japan, where United Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and FedEx,
exercise fifth-freedom rights to provide onward service to a number of Pacific rim desti-
nations. See Fisher, supra note 84, at 331-33. These fifth-freedom rights were created
as part of a restrictive bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Japan, forty years before the
first open skies agreements. See id.
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expanding economy, will benefit. Service expansion and greater competi-
tion would occur among the U.S. carriers which would probably gain the
upper hand in the market, as well as a handful of Chinese carriers. This
would promote increased traffic and its associated benefits. China's air-
lines should not be written off any more than the U.S. carriers should.
Open skies and the competition associated with that policy could jump-
start Chinese airlines, as they learn from, and are forced to adopt, the more
efficient practices of their U.S. competitors. Furthermore, China's domes-
tic aviation market will inevitably continue to grow as long as its economy
expands. Projections suggest that passenger counts will nearly quadruple
during the next decade.2 0 4 This rising tide will spill over into international
markets as well.
C. Mitigating Potential Harm
Although the open skies scenario presented above is not one to
fear,20 5 the United States and China could modify it to mitigate many of
the short-term negative effects that concern the Chinese carriers, while
planting the seeds of long-term opportunity. Specifically, as part of an
open skies agreement, China could allow for increased investment in its
airline by U.S. carriers. This would give the U.S. a stake in the future suc-
cess-not failure-of the Chinese airline industry. And even more impor-
tantly, close partnerships between U.S. and Chinese carriers achieved
through investment would allow the Chinese airlines to draw on U.S. air-
lines' wealth of experience.
With China's aviation market poised to expand, U.S. carriers would
welcome the chance to play a role. Already, three Chinese carriers have
entered into extensive code-sharing arrangements with U.S. airlines, and it
appears that both sides would welcome the opportunity to establish closer
ties. 20 6 In negotiations with other nations, the possibility of partnerships
among the carriers has spurred serious discussion of open skies agree-
ments. In one notable example, the United States and Great Britain re-
opened negotiations for a possible open skies agreement after American
Airlines and British Airways announced plans to form a partnership, which
would have required such an agreement in order to take effect. 20 7 Observ-
ers noted that the proposed partnership provided the impetus for the
renewed, although ultimately unsuccessful, negotiations between the two
204. See Asia/Pacific Growth Slows, supra note 109; Fisher, supra note 84, at 328-29.
205. Although some airlines may suffer, evidence from deregulation in the United
States and open skies agreements forged between the United States and other nations
suggests that free market competition generally leads to lower fares and increased traffic.
See Postrel, supra note 75, at C2; HISTORICAL AIR TRAFFIC STATISTICS: ANNUAL: 1954-1980,
supra note 76; HISTORICAL AIR TRAFFIC STATISTICS: ANNUAL 1981-2000, supra note 28.
206. Slater Calls for Liberalization, supra note 171. Recall American Airlines' interest
in entering a wet-lease agreement with China Southern Airlines. Id.
207. Baliles, supra note 6, at 8; Lick, supra note 17, at 1268. The proposed American
Airlines-British Airways partnership would have required exemption from U.S. anti-trust
laws. Id.
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nations.20 8 Presently, China caps foreign ownership of its airlines at
thirty-five percent, although industry observers speculate this could
increase to forty-nine percent.20 9 Some observers believe foreign capital
may be essential in revamping the Chinese airline industry. 2 10
D. The Chinese Government's Need to Retain Control
Another issue underlying the communist Chinese government's aver-
sion to an open skies agreement may be its fear of losing control of the
airline industry. For much of its existence since the 1949 revolution, the
Chinese government has retained a tenuous hold on power, and it has
taken draconian measures in instances when it has felt threatened, most
notably when it crushed the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in
1989.211 Providing jobs for the population represents yet another form of
control, as Chinese leaders fear that the disappearance of government-
sponsored jobs could spark civil unrest. 212
Although such concerns may contribute to the Chinese government's
aversion to letting market forces, even in small measure, chart the course of
its airlines, with the possible exception of the international arena, market
forces will mandate the continued existence of Chinese airlines. Many
economists have made the very strong argument that, unlike other indus-
tries, a functional airline industry is an essential prerequisite for a prosper-
ous economy. 2t 3 Goods, people, and commerce all depend on the ability
to travel quickly and at an affordable cost between locations. Therefore,
any job losses the Chinese airline industry experiences as the result of an
open skies agreement would necessarily be confined to the realm of its
international operations, which are a very small portion of Chinese air-
lines' overall business.2 14 No foreign carriers have sounded the call for
access to Chinese domestic markets, and the possibility of this occurring
in the foreseeable future appears remote. Under a worst-case scenario,
208. Lick, supra note 17, at 1268.
209. Thomas, supra note 120, at 49.
210. Id.
211. See Henry Chu, Chinese Rulers Fear Angry Workers May Finally Unite; Labor: Ten
Years After Tiananmen Square Crackdown, Unemployment, not Lack of Democracy, Fuels
Discontent, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at Al, A23. Some commentators say the demon-
strations were fueled in part by labor concerns. Id.
212. Id. China's Vice President Hu Jintao recently delivered a message to Chinese
workers: "Without stability, nothing can be achieved, and successes already attained will
be lost .... Workers must wholeheartedly cherish the nation's political stability and
unity." Id.
213. Alan Larson recently stated, "The new economy is also creating very important
new types of demands on air transport, where there is a more logistical focus on a just-
in-time basis. To benefit from this you need to have a flexible and rapid air transport
system." U.S. Pushes Fast Cargo Access, supra note 195.
214. Chinese airlines continue to generate most of their traffic in domestic markets.
See, e.g., IATA: World Air Transport Statistics, supra note 140. For example, in 1998,
China Southern Airlines, China's largest carrier, transported 13.6 million passengers
and 236,289 tons of cargo in domestic markets, while carrying 888,682 passengers and
19,554 tons of cargo in international markets. These statistics are representative of the
Chinese airline industry as a whole. Id. at 69, 79-80.
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even if Chinese airlines find themselves unable to compete against an
onslaught of U.S. airline competition in the U.S.-China market, they will
continue to fulfill an essential, and increasingly substantial niche in the
Chinese domestic market.
E. Looking Ahead
The message emanating from Beijing is that an open skies agreement
with the United States may one day occur, but only when China and its
airlines are ready. Right now, government officials correctly point out, the
two airline industries remain unequal. However, this does not justify
China's reluctance to enter into an open skies agreement. The airline
industries of each nation may never be equal. An open skies agreement,
however, may provide the necessary impetus for Chinese airlines to catch
up with the competition.
In the near future, amending the 1999 U.S.-China aviation accord may
not be a high priority. The U.S. economy has soured, and several of its
carriers, including United, are teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. Mean-
while, the Chinese airline industry appears to be taking small steps toward
self-sufficiency, although it still faces the turbulence associated with gov-
ernment-imposed consolidation. Ultimately, the U.S. airline industry are
likely to rebound along with the nation's economy, and Chinese carriers
may become a force to be reckoned with. Perhaps it should come as little
surprise, then, that in early 2002, the Chinese government, pending con-
sultation with its own carriers, expressed an interest in further formal
negotiations with the United States aimed at amending the 1999 agree-
ment.21 5 Indicative of a continued protectionist attitude, however, the Chi-
nese government announced that it would not consider the possibility of
allowing U.S. carriers to utilize unused route authorities allocated to Chi-
nese airlines.216
Conclusion
Little more than a decade ago, before the inauguration of the world's
first open skies agreements, one could have argued that restrictive bilateral
aviation agreements would have minimal detrimental effect upon the
nations party to them. All nations with international air service sub-
scribed to some form of such an agreement. In essence, all nations stood
on equal footing with one another, and operated under similar sets of
rules, almost all of which limited international air service. But today, an
ever-expanding number of nations have adopted a new set of rules under
the guise of open skies agreements. Evidence, in the form of rising air
traffic and lower fares in open skies markets, suggests that the agreements
have largely been a success, certainly for the traveling public if not for all
airlines.
215. U.S. Seeks More China Talks, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 8, 2002.
216. Id. This is called zombie code sharing. Id.
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Nations that forge open skies agreements will benefit just as certainly
as those nations that fail to enter such agreements will not benefit. Despite
recent events, the world's airline industry will continue to expand and in
doing so will follow the path of least resistance. Airlines will readily fly
where they are free to come and go as they wish. They will avoid markets
they can enter only as the result of an arduous and politically charged
negotiation process. Where airlines fly, trade and economic growth will
follow. Where they do not fly, economic development will suffer.
The U.S. government must continue to pressure China's leaders to
abandon their protectionist position with regard to their airline industry.
While Chinese airlines may incur some short-term pain as the result of an
open skies agreement, the long-term benefits are much greater and cannot
be ignored. An open skies agreement and the improved air service that
accompanies it will facilitate trade and commerce, to the benefit of both
nations. The earlier that the United States and China sign an open skies
agreement, the sooner they will be able to enjoy its fruits.
